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SUMMARY
The principle of stare decisis in United States courts appears in two aspects – the courts of lower 
jurisdiction are bound by the rulings issued by the courts of higher jurisdictions and as a horizontal 
binding of the Supreme Court by its own rulings. The latter ‘binding’ is not as strong as the former 
one, which is reflected in the Supreme Court judges’ opinions and actions, which consist in both 
overruling their own precedents and highlighting the need for maintaining them. The changes of the 
Justices’ attitudes leads to a negative answer to the question whether precedent – which is binding 
only when the Supreme Court’s justices want it to be to be so – is binding precedent at all.
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The phrase stare decisis literally means, “to stand by that which is decided”. In 
the United States judicial system, there are two different aspects of stare decisis. 
First, lower courts in both the state and federal systems are required to follow the 
decisions of higher courts. For example, federal trial courts and federal courts of 
appeals must follow Supreme Court precedent whether or not the judges on the 
lower courts agree with those decisions. Lawyers and judges call this kind of duty 
vertical stare decisis. Although there is little reliable data on the subject, most fed-
eral judges take this obligation seriously and do not issue decisions inconsistent 
with Supreme Court precedent.
The second type of precedent is horizontal stare decisis. The Supreme Court 
is supposed to take its own prior case law seriously and not overturn its own de-
cisions absent a strong reason for doing so. However, the Justices have been less 
than consistent in describing this duty. On the one hand, they have said that the rule 
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of stare decisis is of “fundamental importance to the rule of law”, furthering “the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles”, and con-
tributing to “the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process”1. The Court 
has also said that precedent should normally be followed because “in most matters, 
it is more important that the applicable law be settled than it be settled right”2.
On the other hand, the Justices have often said that its duty to follow their 
own prior decisions is not “an inexorable command”3. When it comes to statutory 
interpretation, where the Congress can overturn an incorrect Court decision, the 
Justices are likely to be more reluctant to overturn cases than in constitutional 
matters where “correction through legislative action is practically impossible”4. 
A Court majority has said on numerous occasions that when a prior case is either 
unworkable or even badly reasoned, the Justices have “never felt constrained to 
follow precedent”5.
In fact, it turns out that in constitutional cases, the Justices have failed to artic-
ulate a coherent philosophy defining their duty to follow their own decisions. One 
commentator has remarked, “the modern doctrine of stare decisis is essentially 
indeterminate. The various factors that drive the doctrine are largely devoid of 
independent meaning or predictive force. Fairly or not, this weakness exposes the 
Court to criticism for appearing results-oriented in its application of stare decisis”6. 
From 1960–2009, according to one study7, the Court reversed roughly 75 of its 
own cases while at the same time often discussing in other cases the importance 
of rule of law values gained by following prior decisions.
The hardest question concerning the role stare decisis plays in Supreme Court 
decision-making is whether the doctrine really matters at all. When the Justices 
affirm a prior decision that they approve of, precedent does little work. The per-
plexing issue is how often do the Justices follow case law that they believe to be 
erroneous. In light of the fact, demonstrated below, that the Court has dramatically 
changed positions in virtually every litigated area of constitutional, the answer is 
likely that stare decisis, contrary to popular myths, does almost no work in Supreme 
Court constitutional cases8.
1 See: R. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, “Washington & Lee Law Review” 2010, 
No. 67, pp. 411–412 (quoting various Supreme Court decisions).
2 Burnett v. Colorado Oil & Gas Company, 285 U.S., 393, 406–407 (1932).
3 R. Kozel, op. cit., p. 414, quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
4 Burnett, 285 U.S. at 407.
5 Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).
6 R. Kozel, op. cit., p. 414.
7 See: R. Standler, Overruled: Stare Decisis in the U.S. Supreme Court, www.rbs2.com/overrule.
pdfhttp://www.rbs2.com/overrule.pdf [access: 10.02.2018].
8 This paper does not address the Justices use of precedent in statutory interpretation cases.
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It would take a book to describe all the areas of constitutional law where the 
Supreme Court has fundamentally altered its own prior doctrine. Nevertheless, 
the examples below should suffice to make the point. At one time, the Justices 
deemed commercial speech simply proposing economic transactions to be com-
pletely outside the scope of the First Amendment, but now the Court fully protects 
such speech9. At one time, the Justices held that the government could provide no 
aid other than secular textbooks to religious schools because the Establishment 
Clause forbid that use of tax dollars, but now the Court permits virtually all aid if 
the materials, supplies, or vouchers are also provided to children in non-religious 
schools. In addition, under the first amendment, the Court once held that schools 
could require children to say the pledge of allegiance, but just a few years later, 
reversed that decision10.
In 1871, in a landmark decision, the Supreme Court held that Congress did 
not have the legal authority to issue paper money because the Constitution only 
mentions “Coin”. Just a year later, after President Ulysses S. Grant, made two 
appointments to the Court, both of whom were known to be in favor of federal 
authority to make paper money legal tender, the Justices reversed their decision 
and approved that authority even though the only thing that had changed during 
that year was the composition of the Court11. A newspaper at the time said that the 
second decision “is generally regarded not as the solemn adjudication of an upright 
and impartial tribunal, but as a base compliance with Executive instructions by 
creatures of the President placed upon the Bench to carry out his instructions”12.
From 1791–2007, the Supreme Court had never interpreted the Second Amend-
ment, which provides that “A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”, 
to confer on individuals a personal right to own guns. In 1935, the Court in United 
States v. Miller interpreted that text to apply only to those arms that bear a “reason-
able relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia”13. Yet, 
in 2008, in a five-to-four opinion, the Court held exactly the opposite in District of 
Columbia v. Heller14, finding that people have a constitutional right to bear arms in 
the home for self-defense providing those arms are in “common use”.
9 See: Public Funding for Religious Schools, www.pewforum.org/2009/05/14/shifting-bound-
aries5 [access: 10.02.2018].
10 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
11 See: www.thegoldstandardnow.org/the-legal-tender-cases [access: 10.02.2018].
12 S. Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?, “Political Science Quarterly” 
1935, No. 50, pp. 343, 347–348 (quoting Ch. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 
Boston 1926, pp. 525–526). 
13 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
14 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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An issue that the Court has changed its mind on numerous times is whether 
Congress may require state governments to perform federally specified tasks when 
Congress exercises enumerated powers. In 1936, the Court said that Congress could 
regulate California’s state-owned railroad without regard to state sovereignty15. The 
Court stated clearly that the “power of a state to fix intrastate railroad rates must 
yield to the power of the national government when their regulation is appropriate 
to the regulation of interstate commerce”16. In other words, when Congress enacts 
legislation pursuant to its enumerated powers, states may not object to that regu-
lation on the basis of state sovereignty.
This ruling remained in effect until 1976 when the Court held in National 
League of Cities v. Usery17, that Congress could not regulate a state’s traditional 
governmental functions. Then, in 1985, the Court reversed course again in Garcia 
v. San Antonio Transit Authority18, when the Justices explicitly reversed Usery. The 
Court once again said that state sovereignty does not trump Congress’ enumerated 
powers. Once again, Congress could commandeer the states and make them do 
federal bidding.
Garcia, however, also did not last. Once Justice Clarence Thomas changed the 
balance of the Court in 1991, the Justices reversed course yet again. In two cases, 
the conservatives on the Court created an anti-commandeering principle that even 
when Congress exercises powers under Article I, it may not require states to assist 
in the implementation of federal law, unless the law also applies to private actors 
as well19.
A few years later, the Court cast some doubt on this doctrine, holding that Con-
gress could dictate conditions to state-operated motor vehicle departments when 
they wanted to sell their citizens’ drivers’ license information despite the state’s 
anti-commandeering argument20. This history of holdings, counter-holdings, and 
then counter-counter holdings from 1937 to today shows clearly that the Justices 
are more than willing to make a mockery of the idea of stare decisis.
There are many other important areas of constitutional law where the Justices 
have reversed prior decisions for no other reason than the Justices possessed differ-
15 U.S. v. California, 297 U.S. 175 at 183–185 (1936).
16 U.S. v. California, 297 U.S. 175 at 184.
17 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
18 Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
19 New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 at 149 (1992) (“[W]hile Congress has substantial power under 
the Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated 
within their borders, the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the 
States to do so”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 at 935 (1997) (“Congress cannot circumvent 
[the rule of New York] by conscripting the State’s officers directly. The Federal Government may 
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ 
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program”).
20 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 at 149–151 (2000).
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ent values than the ones who decided the prior case or doctrine. The Justices have 
changed their minds on whether sovereign immunity bars lawsuits against a state 
by citizens of that state21; on whether states can impose the death penalty on the 
mentally ill and juveniles under the age of 1822; and on whether corporations have 
the same freedom of speech rights as people23. In sum, the Court has issued major 
reversals in the areas of freedom of speech, separation of church and state, gun 
rights, the death penalty, federalism, and a myriad of other individual rights claims.
The Supreme Court of the United States is a hybrid legal-political institution. 
The Justices are the only highest court judges in the free world who hold their offices 
for life. They are often asked to interpret vague constitutional and statutory text 
with contested historical accounts of why the drafters enacted that text24. The myth 
that prior cases matter to the Justices is one of the ways the American people keep 
faith in this unique governmental institution. However, as this paper has shown, 
the Justices reverse themselves on a regular basis and often for no other reason 
than the people who serve as Justices have changed, and so have the values of the 
Institution. If precedent only matters when the Justices want it to, does it really 
matter at all? Sadly, the answer appears to be no.
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STRESZCZENIE
Formuła stare decisis w porządku common law występuje w dwóch aspektach – jako związanie 
sądów niższych orzeczeniami sądów wyższych oraz jako horyzontalne związanie Sądu Najwyższego 
własnymi decyzjami. To drugie „związanie” nie jest tak mocne, jak to pierwsze, co przejawia się 
w przekonaniach i działaniach sędziów tego sądu, które polegają tak na przełamywaniu swoich pre-
cedensów, jak i na podkreślaniu potrzeby ich podtrzymywania. Dają się zauważyć w tym kontekście 
zmiany stanowiska sądu w różnych okresach jego funkcjonowania, co prowadzi jednak do negatywnej 
odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy precedens, który wiąże jedynie wówczas, gdy chcą tego sędziowie Sądu 
Najwyższego, jest w ogóle precedensem wiążącym.
Słowa kluczowe: precedens; stare decisis; przełamanie; Sąd Najwyższy Stanów Zjednocznych
Pobrane z czasopisma Studia Iuridica Lublinensia http://studiaiuridica.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 19:27:04
UM
C
Po
we
red
 by
 TC
PD
F (w
ww
.tcp
df.o
rg)
